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Abstract
Advanced sensing is a key ingredient for intelligent control in Industrial Internet
of Things (IIoT) environments. Coupled with enhanced communication capa-
bilities, sensors are becoming increasingly vulnerable to cyberattacks, thereby
jeopardizing the often safety-critical underlying cyber-physical system. One
prominent approach to sensor-level attack detection in modern industrial envi-
ronments, named pasad, has recently been proposed in the literature. Pasad
is a process-aware stealthy-attack detection mechanism that has shown promis-
ing capabilities in detecting anomalous, potentially malicious behavior through
real-time monitoring of sensor measurements. Although fast and lightweight, a
major limitation of pasad is that it is univariate, meaning that only a single
sensor can be monitored by one instance of the algorithm. This impediment
poses serious concerns on its scalability, especially in modernized industrial en-
vironments, which typically employ a plethora of sensors. This paper generalizes
pasad to the multivariate case, where a plurality of sensors can be monitored
concurrently with little added complexity. This generalization has the evident
advantage of offering scalability potential for deployment in future-focused in-
dustrial environments, which are undergoing growing integration between the
digital and physical worlds.
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1. Introduction
The new generation of cyber-physical systems underpinned by the Industrial
Internet of Things (IIoT) paradigm often employ sensors as a means to gather
data from the physical world for controllers to decide on proper actuation. There
is an implicit trust in sensors in the sense that the received measurements are
assumed to be authentic and reflect the actual physical state of the sensed
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environment, which may potentially lead to malicious control decisions if com-
promised by motivated adversaries. In environments that involve controlling
safety-critical processes (e.g., nuclear plants, power and gas distribution, auto-
mated transport systems, etc.), such an unsubstantiated assumption may wreak
consequential havoc on society at large.
Recently, a process-aware stealthy-attack detection mechanism (pasad) has
been proposed as a novel approach to detecting cyberattacks on cyber-physical
systems by detecting implausible sensor behavior [1]. The method, which is
partly based on a new time-series analysis technique known as singular spectrum
analysis [2], consists of a training phase and a detection phase. In the train-
ing phase, an initial part of the time series collected under normal operating
conditions is used to define a baseline for the underlying system behavior. Af-
terwards, in the detection phase, a departure-detection mechanism continuously
verifies whether or not current sensor observations conform to the established
baseline.
The enabler of data-driven anomaly-detection techniques such as pasad is
the regularity of the process-level traffic in industrial environments, which stems
from the static nature of the communication between field devices in automa-
tion systems. The method has demonstrated promising capabilities in detecting
potential attack-induced departure of the physical process from normal dynam-
ics through real-time monitoring of sensor measurements, and has been shown
to be sufficiently lightweight to run on limited-resource hardware [3].
However, one fundamental limitation of pasad is that it is univariate; that
is to say, a single instance of the algorithm can only process one sensor at a
time. With the proliferation of sensors in modern industrial environments, this
aspect of the method is likely to be problematic, especially that the “smartness”
of future-focused industrial environments is tightly related to employing more
sensors for the task of collecting data to gain more insight into the environment
and increase operational efficiency.
Although lightweight, fast, and suitable for distributed environments, the
canonical way of monitoring n sensors simultaneously with pasad at choke
points is to awkwardly train and run n instances of the algorithm. Evidently, as
the number of sensors grows large, the total time-to-train and allocated memory
for deployment can quickly become overwhelming. The inevitable complexity
and overhead involved in this approach is likely to hinder large-scale deployment
of pasad in industrial environments. Yet, with the monotonically increasing
utilization of sensors, the scalability property is, at any rate, highly desirable.
In this paper, we introduce m-pasad, a multivariate extension of pasad that
can handle a plurality of sensors efficiently. Rather than employing a plurality
of pasad instances, our proposed approach adapts the underlying theory to
accommodate multiple sensors with little added complexity both in terms of
running time and memory footprint. As such, m-pasad inherits key features
from pasad, such as its noise-reduction potential, its capability to detect subtle
structural changes in the monitored signal, and its efficient evaluation of the
departure score during the detection phase.
We evaluate our approach using the popular Tennessee-Eastman (TE) pro-
cess control simulation model and perform benchmarking using publicly avail-
able data and attack scenarios. Experimental results demonstrate that m-pasad
trains an order of magnitude faster than pasad, requires constant memory in-
dependently of the number of sensors, and is consistently faster at computing
the departure score during the detection phase. This boost in performance
enables the deployment of m-pasad on limited-resource hardware (e.g., micro-
controllers) even when monitoring a relatively large number of sensors, which is
hardly possible for the univariate version of the algorithm.
The remainder of this paper is laid out as follows: We start off by presenting
pasad in Section 2, then Section 3 introduces the multivariate extension m-
pasad, which we evaluate in Section 5. In Section 6, we review related literature
and we conclude this work in Section 7.
2. PASAD: The Univariate Case
This section presents an overview of pasad. A comprehensive account of
both the theoretical and the practical aspects of the method can be found in [1].
Pasad is a data-driven anomaly detection technique that takes as input a
continuously sampled time series of sensor measurements and outputs an alert
upon detection of unexpected behavior.
Consider a continuous real-valued time series
T = x1, x2, · · · , xN , xN+1, · · · (1)
of process measurements corresponding to a single sensor, pasad initially em-
beds T into a trajectory space and then determines a basis for a low-dimensional
subspace in which the deterministic behavior of the underlying signal is presum-
ably more pronounced. The embedding is performed during an offline training
phase by unfolding a subseries of T of length N into a trajectory Hankel matrix
X =

x1 x2 . . . xK





xL xL+1 . . . xN
 , (2)
whose K = N − L+ 1 columns are the L-dimensional lagged vectors
xi = (xi, xi+1, · · · , xi+L−1)T . (3)
The next step in the training phase is to determine a subset of eigenvectors
of the covariance matrix C = XXT that can sufficiently describe the underlying
signal. To compute the eigenvectors of the covariance matrix, the singular
value decomposition (SVD) of the trajectory matrix is performed to obtain
the L left-singular vectors of X, or equivalently, the eigenvectors of C. The r
leading orthonormal eigenvectors u1,u2, · · · ,ur that correspond to the r largest
eigenvalues form the basis of a so-called signal subspace, where r is referred to
as the statistical dimension of the time series. The parameters N,L, and, r are
determined during the offline training phase.
Now that the signal subspace has been identified by means of an orthonormal
basis, pasad proceeds by constructing a linear transformation that projects the
lagged vectors (Eq. (3)) in the trajectory space onto the signal subspace, where
the detection of anomalies is supposed to take place. This linear transformation
is given by UT such that
U = [u1 : u2 : · · · : ur]. (4)
In fact, by virtue of being a partial isometry, the linear transformation UT
transforms the lagged vectors from the trajectory space into the r-dimensional
Euclidean space Rr, which has been shown to be isomorphic to the signal sub-
space [1], without the need for the more expensive explicit projection onto the
signal subspace. The authors argued that by obviating the need to project
the lagged vectors onto the signal subspace in order to compute vector norms,
the detection procedure gained a significant performance uplift, and coined this
property as the isometry trick. The isometry trick states that for an arbitrary
vector x in the trajectory space, computing the norm of the vector UTx has
the effect of implicitly projecting x onto the signal subspace and computing its
norm there. In mathematical terms, for an arbitrary vector x, it holds that
||UTx|| = ||UUTx||. The isometry trick is applicable in the multivariate case
since UT is still a partial isometry (row vectors are orthonormal).
On account of the noise-reduced representation in the signal subspace, the
transformed lagged vectors follow a pattern under normal operating conditions.
The task in the detection phase is to detect a potential departure from this
pattern that correlates with a structural change in the monitored sensor signal.
To this end, every lagged vector of sensor measurements is used to compute a
departure score at every iteration in the detection phase.
One way of evaluating the departure score is by computing the Euclidean
distance between the most recent test vector and the centroid of the cluster
formed by the vectors projected during the training phase. Consequently, an
anomaly—or rather a departure—would drive the distance from the cluster to
higher values, and accordingly, pasad raises an alert whenever this distance
crosses a predetermined threshold.
3. M-PASAD: The Multivariate Extension
We now introduce m-pasad, the multivariate extension of pasad, whereby
multiple sensors can be processed simultaneously to detect anomalous behavior
in the underlying system. A succinct description of the workflow of m-pasad is
presented in the schematic in Figure 1.
As argued in Section 1, a theoretical solution to the multivariate case of
pasad is motivated by the impracticality of running a large number of instances
of the algorithm to monitor a plurality of sensors. Our central argument in this

























Figure 1: A schematic depicting the workflow of m-pasad.
inheriting the key characteristics and prominent features from the univariate
version.
Essentially, the objective is to identify a signal subspace that describes the
common underlying signal during the training phase and to construct a mecha-
nism by which the n most recent sensor measurements are incorporated in the
computation of the departure score during the detection phase.
To make progress, consider n time series of measurements
T (j) = x(j)1 , x(j)2 , · · · , x(j)N , x(j)N+1, · · · (5)
where j = 1, 2, · · · , n, corresponding to n sensors. Before commencing the
training phase, as a pre-processing step, the time series of measurements are
standardized to prevent some sensors from overweighing other sensors due to
difference in scale. This is performed by subtracting the mean and dividing by
the standard deviation after having inferred the parameters from the training
subseries of the respective sensors. Specifically, for the time series T (j), the




where µ(j) and σ(j) stand for the mean and standard deviation computed over
the training subseries T (j) = x(j)1 , x(j)2 , · · · , x
(j)
N of the j
th sensor.
3.1. Training Phase: The Stacked Hankel Matrix
The main idea in the training phase is to embed all the time-series data in a
common trajectory space. Our construction for identifying a common trajectory
space is a stacked Hankel matrix, where the L×K trajectory matrices X(j) of the
respective sensors are stacked into one L×nK common trajectory matrix X as
follows (see (1) in Figure 1)
X =
[
X(1) : X(2) : · · · : X(n)
]
· (7)
As in the univariate case, a spectral decomposition of the trajectory matrix
is performed to obtain a basis for the signal subspace. Solving the SVD of
X, however, can quickly become impractical as the number of sensors n grows
sufficiently large. A more sensible approach is to solve the eigenvalue decom-
position of the covariance matrix C = XXT , which proves to be an efficient
alternative since C is of dimension L×L, similar to the univariate case (see (2)
in Figure 1). Another advantage of this approach is that the covariance matrix
can be evaluated efficiently by leveraging the additive property






allowing the covariance matrix to be constructed sequentially without the need
to store the individual trajectory matrices of all n sensors in memory. As the
covariance matrix C is of dimension L×L, similar to the covariance matrix in the
univariate case, Eq. (8) can be regarded as the only added complexity during
the training phase.
Finally, after obtaining the eigenvectors by spectral decomposition, which
describe the common structure of the sensor signals and form a basis for a com-
mon signal subspace, the partial isometry UT is constructed as in the univariate
version (see (3) in Figure 1).
Unlike the case with pasad, however, the linear transformation cannot be
applied directly on the lagged vectors to map them to the signal subspace. Next,
we introduce a methodical procedure for constructing a unified vector, namely
an aggregate test vector, out of every n lagged vectors, to enable this mapping.
3.2. Detection Phase: The Aggregate Test Vector
The principal challenge in the detection phase—and indeed to the success of
m-pasad—is to construct a single test vector that meaningfully represents the
n individual test vectors for every new set of sensor measurements, in order to
be able to project onto the signal subspace and perform the intended analysis
there.
What follows in this section is based on the key idea of examining the change
in the covariance matrix C incurred by adding a single set of lagged vectors to
the common trajectory matrix X, or equivalently, by incorporating an additional
set of new measurements into the training subseries.
For the sake of illustration, we will first consider the case of two sensors with
time series T (1) and T (2) having L×K trajectory matrices X(1) and X(2) respec-
tively. We shall subsequently show that the generalization to the n-dimensional
case is straightforward.
Originally, the common trajectory matrix in the 2D case is the L×2K stacked





















































Now, in order to analyze the change incurred by incorporating an additional









be L×(K+1) augmented trajectory
matrices, then the modified common trajectory matrix is given by
X̃ =

























































K+1 are the two lagged vectors added to the trajectory matrices of
the two time series respectively. Letting u := x(1)K+1 and v := x
(2)
K+1, the modified
covariance matrix can then be expressed as








= C + uuT + vvT .
(11)
As Eq. (11) implies, due to the additive property of the covariance matrix
in Eq. (8), every set of new sensor measurements from all sensors adds to the
covariance matrix a sum of outer products of the respective lagged vectors.
Thus, our quest for finding a single vector whose components are functions of
the individual lagged vectors boils down to solving for a vector w such that
wwT = uuT + vvT . (12)
Expanding Eq. (12) as
w21 x . . . x










1 x · · · x
x u22 + v
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x x · · · u2L + v2L

and examining the diagonal entries, one arrives at a solution to the ith compo-






Note that for simplicity reasons, only the positive square roots were consid-
ered in the solution, which were empirically found to yield a sufficiently accurate
end result. Also note that the arbitrary non-diagonal entries need not be con-
sidered for the solution since the u’s and v’s on the right-hand side are known.
Let wδ be the δ
th aggregate test vector, then for the general n-dimensional














where i = δ − L+ 1, δ − L+ 2, · · · , δ.
Equation (14) effectively implies that the test vectors x(1)K+1,x
(2)
K+1, · · · ,x(n)K+1
from all n sensors can be represented by a single aggregate test vector wδ.




i , · · · , x(n)i )T , then the δth aggregate test vector is
precisely
wδ = (||yδ−L+1|| ||yδ−L+2|| · · · ||yδ||)T , (15)
where || · || is the `2 norm (see (4) in Figure 1).
Importantly, the (δ + 1)th aggregate test vector only requires computing
||yδ+1|| since the previous L − 1 components have already been computed for
the preceding vector due to the sequential nature of the algorithm. Therefore,
computing the norm of the vector containing the most recent sensor measure-
ments according to Eq. (14) is the only added complexity in the detection phase.
Now that an aggregate test vector is constructed at every iteration, the
partial isometry can be used to map the time-series data from the trajectory
space to the signal subspace (see (5) in Figure 1).
Thereafter, at the δth iteration during the detection phase, if the squared
Euclidean distance between the test vector and the centroid c of the cluster
formed by the training vectors is to be used as a metric, the δth departure score
would then be evaluated as
Dδ = ||UTwδ − c||2. (16)
Finally, as in the univariate case, whenever Dδ crosses a predetermined
threshold, m-pasad raises an alert. The threshold is determined by testing
on a validation subseries of sensor readings during normal operating conditions.
Based on the obtained departure scores, we then choose a statistically plausible
level beyond which the algorithm generates an alarm.
4. Discussion and Remarks
Both PASAD and M-PASAD are train-only-once model, making them prac-
tical and easy to maintain. However, the training model might need to be
updated (offline) when there is a change in the sensor dynamics. This could
happen, for instance, when the sensor is connected to a control loop and the
logic/configuration of the controller has been altered/updated. That said, reg-
ularly updating the training parameters could be plausible if there are enough
resources to account for latent factors that may affect the detection accuracy in
the long term.
It is also worth noting that, in industrial environments, such sudden events as
emergency stop signals may sometimes be triggered. These events are typically
rare and may be triggered once every 5 years. As these events may be deemed
anomalous by our method, we argue that blacklisting and/or whitelistening can
be a good complementary measure for flagging such rare events.
When it comes to how long the training data should be, the rule of thumb is
to train on a long enough subseries that contains a whole cycle of the underlying
signal (and preferably multiple cycles). But longer data does not necessarily
mean longer time if the sampling rate is taken into account. Also, the starting
position for training in the time series of sensor measurements can be arbitrary.
Multivariate PASAD is not a direct application of multivariate singular spec-
trum analysis (SSA) [4, 5]. The main task in SSA of general time series is to
reconstruct the signal and perform forecasting by identifying a so-called lin-
ear recurrent relation. SSA is also primarily used for exploratory analysis of
complex time series by identifying trends, periods, and other structures. The
construction we used for spectral decomposition in M-PASAD (stacked Hankel
matrix) is known and used in some SSA-related methodologies. However, the
successful M-PASAD procedure is due to the mechanism of constructing a mean-
ingful aggregate test vector on the fly as sensor measurements arrive, thereby
enabling the remaining procedures developed for PASAD, namely, projection
onto subspace and computing departure scores.
Finally, as is typically the case with every data-driven anomaly-based detec-
tion algorithm, we make the implicit assumption that the data used for training
is attack-free.
5. Evaluation
We evaluate m-pasad using the Tennessee-Eastman (TE) process control
model. While the original algorithm has been shown to work in more complex
scenarios involving sensors with more varying dynamics [1, 6, 7], this choice of
simulation platform is particularly suitable for evaluating m-pasad since it was
used to evaluate pasad,1 which makes the results comparable. We first start
1Available at https://github.com/mikeliturbe/pasad
Figure 2: Evolution of the 41 TE measured variables over time before and after an attack.
with a high-level description of the TE process, then we present experimental
results followed by an evaluation of m-pasad’s performance.
We investigate the detection accuracy of m-pasad and benchmark its per-
formance against pasad with respect to running time of both the training phase
and the detection phase.
5.1. The Tennessee-Eastman Process
The attacks were performed using the open-source DVCP-TE Simulink im-
plementation of the TE process control simulation model [8, 9].2 The model
simulates a real plant-wide chemical process, which was originally released to
challenge the control theory community to develop and benchmark different op-
timized control strategies. Later, however, the TE model has become a popular
choice amongst security researchers for evaluating attack-detection solutions for
being a realistic and safe environment for experimentation [10, 11, 8].
The simulated chemical process produces two liquid products (G,H) from
four gaseous reactants (A,C,D,E), in addition to a byproduct (F ) and an inert
(B), making a total of eight chemical components, coded after the first eight
letters of the alphabet. There are five main operation units: reactor, condenser,
recycle compressor, vapor-liquid separator, and stripping column. The gaseous
reactants, fed by three different feeds, react to form liquid products. These
products, along with residual reactants, leave the reactor as vapors, which are
2Available at https://github.com/satejnik/DVCP-TE
then cooled by the condenser to return to the liquid state. Next, the vapor-
liquid separator isolates the non-condensed vapors, which are fed once again to
the reactor by using a centrifugal compressor. The condensed components, on
the other hand, move to a stripping column to remove the remaining residual
reactants. The final product (mix of G and H) exits the stripper and heads
towards a refining section that separates its components. Finally, the inert and
the byproduct are purged in the vapor-liquid separator as vapor.
The process has 41 measured variables that comprise the readings of the sen-
sors. The controller reads the measured values and, based on the implemented
control strategy, sends commands to actuators that control different process
flows.
The time series of sensor measurements displayed in Figure 2 show the evo-
lution of the sensors before and after an attack is in effect. As shown in the
figure, the sensors react differently to the attack, some exhibiting less obvious
change in dynamics than others.
5.2. Experimental Results
Integrity attacks on the TE process were simulated on both sensors and
actuators as depicted in Figure 3. Once attackers gain access to a control
network in charge of a process, they can either compromise the data fed to the
controller by tampering with the process readings transmitted by the sensors,
or tamper with the commands sent by the controller to the actuators. In the
former case, the controller makes decisions based on maliciously modified data,
potentially leading to the destabilization of the process. In the latter case, the
process acts on arbitrary commands sent by the attacker rather than on the
commands sent by the controller.
The attacks were designed with two main objectives in mind: (i) Stealth
attacks, designed to cause slow damaging perturbations and aim to degrade the
performance of the process; and (ii) direct damage attacks where the attacker’s
goal is to cause damage to physical equipment (e.g., reactor, stripping column,
pipes, etc.) that is essential for the process to run, mainly by driving the process
to unsafe operating conditions (e.g., high temperature or pressure).
The attacker model proposed by Krotofil et al. [11] is used in the experiments,
where measured variables u′i(t) and y
′





ui(t), yi(t) for t /∈ Ta
uai (t), y
a
i (t) for t ∈ Ta
(17)




i (t) correspond to the i
th original and modified
measured variables at time 0 ≤ t ≤ T respectively, T is the duration of the
simulation run, and Ta is the attack interval.
5.2.1. Stealth Attacks
In stealth attacks, attackers try to remain undetected by keeping the pro-





Figure 3: Attack scenarios on control systems: Attacks on actuator signals (1) and attacks on
sensor signals (2).
operators are alerted. In the stealth attack used in this work, the manipulated
variable corresponding to the purge valve that controls the output of accumu-
lating reactor gases is modified. Opening this valve more than necessary would
result in products being wasted, since in order to maintain the production rate,
more reactants would need to be purged from the reactor and fed to the process.
However, opening the purge valve too much would drive the reactor pressure to
a too low level, causing the process to halt. In this scenario, the manipulated
variable is set to 28% open, which is wide enough to degrade the performance
of the process without interrupting the process execution.
5.2.2. Direct Damage Attacks
Direct-damage attacks aim to sabotage equipment and eventually lead to
the interruption of the process. In the direct-damage attack used in this work,
the manipulated variable corresponding to the valve that controls the cooling
water flow to the reactor to prevent its pressure from reaching dangerous levels
is modified. Therefore, it is a critical valve in the process. In this scenario, the
valve is set to 35.9% open, slightly less than the optimal setting. Consequently,
the pressure adds up inside the reactor and the TE process execution eventually
stops due to reaching the predefined safety limits.
5.2.3. Description of Results
We apply m-pasad under both of the described attack scenarios, where all
41 sensors were monitored concurrently. The results are displayed in Figure 4a
and Figure 4b for the direct-damage and stealth attacks respectively. As
mentioned earlier, in the direct-damage attack, the manipulated variable cor-
responding to the valve that controls the cooling water flow to the reactor is
modified to cause the pressure to add up inside the reactor and reach danger-
ous levels. In the stealth attack, the manipulated variable corresponding to the
(a) Detection of a direct-damage attack. (b) Detection of a stealth attack.
Figure 4: M-pasad detecting various attacks on the TE process by monitoring all sensors.
purge valve that controls the output of accumulating reactor gases is carefully
modified to degrade the performance of the process without interrupting the
process execution.
Note that the blue shaded region in the figures corresponds to the sub-
series used for training and the red shaded region marks the attack time frame.
The upper plots show the evolution of the standardized sensor measurements
both under normal operating conditions and after the attacks were initiated at
T = 40h. The lower plots display the departure scores computed iteratively
by m-pasad for every sensor measurement during the detection phase, and the
predetermined thresholds. As explained in Section 3.2, the departure score is
computed by evaluating the distance between the most recent test vector and the
cluster of normal vectors formed during the training phase. Note that the dif-
ference in scale between the two attack scenarios is due to the fact that stealthy
attacks require a larger value for the lag parameter to allow for the detection
of subtle changes in the sensor dynamics. It is also worth pointing out that it
takes longer for the direct-damage attack to be detected because it takes time
for the pressure to add up inside the reactor to abnormal levels after changing
the valve state. Once such levels are reached however, the impact of the attack
on the process accelerates and quickly drives it to an unsafe state.
As the results in Figure 4 indicate, m-pasad successfully detects both types
of attacks. Furthermore, one particular advantage of pasad over similar meth-
ods in the domain is its distinctive capability to detect subtle changes in the
noisy signal, typically induced by a stealthy attack. As demonstrated in Fig-
ure 5, this important feature is not compromised in m-pasad. The 8 sensors
displayed in Figure 5a were specifically picked from the dataset for having a
subtle non-obvious reaction to a stealth attack. Then, Figure 5b shows how
m-pasad indeed manages to detect the subtle changes, suggesting that the pro-
cedure for aggregating test vectors does not incur noticeable information loss.
5.3. Performance Benchmarking
The reduction in memory footprint using our approach is fairly clear: m-
pasad requires storing only one r×L matrix to perform the detection, indepen-
dently of the number of sensors it monitors, whereas pasad requires storing n
(a) TE sensors with subtle reaction to the attack. (b) M-pasad can detect stealthy attacks.
Figure 5: The procedures for combining individual trajectory matrices into one common
matrix and combining lagged vectors into an aggregate test vector do not undermine m-pasad’s
capability of detecting subtle structural changes.
such matrices, thereby reducing the space complexity from linear in the size of
the partial isometry to constant.
To highlight the gain in execution time, on the other hand, we have bench-
marked m-pasad against pasad with respect to the time-to-train and the time-
to-test. As we claimed in Section 3, m-pasad’s performance is superior to that
of pasad’s because the only overhead imposed is constructing the trajectory
matrix according to Eq. (8) in the training phase, and evaluating the Lth com-
ponent of the δth aggregate test vector according to Eq. (15) in the detection
phase. In Figure 6, we substantiate this claim by comparing training time and
detection time of both algorithms as the number of monitored sensors increases
gradually to 1000 sensors. In each algorithmic run with n sensors, the univari-
ate version pasad is run n times and the processing time is added accordingly,
whereas the multivariate version m-pasad is run only once. As showcased in
Figure 6a and Figure 6b respectively, the multivariate algorithm runs an order of
magnitude faster during the training phase, and is consistently more efficient at















(a) Time-to-train w.r.t. number of sensors.
















(b) Time-to-test w.r.t. number of sensors.
Figure 6: Benchmarking m-pasad against pasad with respect to time-to-train (a) and time-
to-test (b) as the number of sensors increases. M-pasad exhibits an order of magnitude boost
in training performance and is consistently faster during the detection phase.
computing the departure scores than the univariate algorithm in the detection
phase.
In light of these results, we argue that m-pasad scales well in industrial envi-
ronments with ubiquitous sensing, while still preserving the detection accuracy
of the original method.
6. Related Work
The new generation of cyber-physical systems, equipped with advanced sens-
ing and communication, form the backbone of the emerging smart industrial
environments. Process-level attack detection is concerned with monitoring the
triad of sensing, actuation, and control to identify implausible behavior in the
physical process.
Efforts to develop attack-detection mechanisms suitable for the ubiquitous,
complex, and heterogeneous cyber-physical systems are gaining traction in the
control-engineering discipline as well as in the cyber-security community. Fol-
lowing is a non-exhaustive list of research works on detecting various kinds
of cyberattacks in industrial environments. A more comprehensive account of
related work can be found in the surveys [12, 13, 14].
State Estimation methods are frequently used in this domain [15, 16, 17,
10, 18], where state-space models are typically created from measurements and
knowledge about the system to mathematically represent the physical process.
Then, the difference between the estimated state and the actual state of the
monitored system is analyzed to detect if the physical process is drifting from
normal dynamics. Statistical methods employ different statistical means such
as Auto-Regression [19], χ2 statistic [20], and Kalman filters [21], to perform
statistical tests on residuals in order to identify significant deviations that may
be attributed to malicious acts. Machine Learning and Data Mining methods,
which use machine learning techniques, e.g., LSTM Neural Networks [22, 23],
and Data Mining techniques, e.g., common path and clustering [24, 25], trained
on features extracted from process data to define a baseline behavior and there-
after detect anomalies.
Our approach is different from the related work in that it builds upon a
model-free time-series based method that does not require models of the phys-
ical process as it learns the system dynamics purely from raw historical sensor
measurements.
7. Conclusion
The forward-looking progression of industrial environments is heavily de-
pendent on advanced sensing and communication capabilities, which renders
critical-infrastructure more vulnerable to cyberattacks. A process-level attack-
detection mechanism, named pasad, which monitors sensors for malicious be-
havior, has recently been proposed in the literature. Being univariate, monitor-
ing multiple sensors requires multiple instances of pasad running concurrently,
a fact that greatly limits its scalability. In this paper, we introduced m-pasad,
a multivariate extension of pasad, that overcomes the mentioned limitation by
adapting the underlying theory such that multiple sensors can be monitored
concurrently by one instance of the algorithm. We showed that the proposed
algorithm is consistently faster than the original one, and that it has a consid-
erably smaller memory footprint. We also argued that since the extension is at
the theoretical level, m-pasad inherits all the benefits from the univariate ver-
sion, making it equally capable of detecting subtle behavioral changes induced
by stealthy attacks.
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